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Abstract
This paper examines the distributional effects of international trade in a general
equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a welfare state redistributing in-
come. The redistribution scheme is financed by a progressive income tax and gives
the same absolute transfer to all individuals. Ceteris paribus, international trade
leads to an increase in income per capita but also to higher income inequality on
two fronts. Inter-group inequality between managers and workers increases, and
intra-group inequality within the group of managers goes up as well. We show that
for constant tax rates, there is an endogenous increase in the size of the welfare
state that works against the increase in inequality, yet cannot offset it. The paper
also sheds light on the conditions under which trade can actually lead to a Pareto
improvement.
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1 Introduction
This paper looks at distributional effects of globalization in the presence of a welfare state re-
distributing income. Distributional effects of globalization are a topic hotly debated both by the
general public and by academia.1 The recent academic literature suggests that trade leads to
overall gains but also to a rise in income inequality. 2 Scheve and Slaughter (2007) argue that
this increase in inequality might lead to a protectionist drift in society. The authors therefore
ask for “a New Deal for globalization” that links globalization with redistribution policies. This
means it might be vital to accompany trade liberalization by redistribution policies if we want the
current level of economic integration to be sustainable. This paper aims to contribute to exactly
this discussion.
The basic model setup is linked to Egger and Kreickemeier (2012), which is a trade model
of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms and occupational choice. A model with
heterogeneity allows us to get a richer picture of distributional effects of globalization that would
not be present in a model with homogeneous firms. It is assumed that individuals are heterogeneous
with respect to their managerial ability. According to their individual ability individuals choose
whether to become a manager or a worker. This occupational choice mechanism is as in Lucas
(1978). Individuals can only use their managerial ability in the role as managers. This means
that there is heterogeneity within the group of managers, but not within the group of workers.
We look at a progressive tax-transfer system. The redistribution scheme is financed by a tax
solely on profit income and gives the same absolute transfer payment to all individuals. It can be
interpreted as a very simple representation of a progressive income tax, since managers represent
the high income group whereas workers represent the low income group. It is possible to look at
two aspects of income inequality within this framework, namely inter-group inequality between
managers and workers and intra-group inequality within the group of managers. Inter-group
inequality is calculated as average post tax-transfer managerial income compared to post tax-
transfer labour income whereas intra-group inequality is given by the Gini coefficient for post
tax-transfer managerial income. We consider trade between two symmetric countries, Home and
Foreign. In particular this also implies that the tax-transfer system is the same in the two countries.
There are two types of costs involved with trade. Firstly, the standard iceberg transport cost and
secondly, a fixed exporting cost. This fixed exporting cost leads to selection of only the most
productive firms into exporting.
We show that also in the presence of a progressive redistribution scheme gains from trade
1See Harrison et al. (2011) for a non-technical overview on this topic in general and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)
for a survey on distributional effects of globalization in developing countries.
2See for example Egger and Kreickemeier (2009a, 2012); Helpman et al. (2010); Yeaple (2005).
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survive. As argued by Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) trade leads to a higher cutoff productivity
and a self-selection of the most productive firms into exporting. This selection effect increases
welfare, measured as output per capita, in the economy. This increase in welfare, however, comes
at a cost. For a given tax rate, inequality in the open economy equilibrium is higher than under
autarky. We find that both inter-group inequality and intra-group inequality within the group of
managers increase. We show that the redistribution scheme considered affects the occupational
choice of individuals. The implication of this finding is that the cutoff ability level, the factor
allocation and welfare depend on the tax-transfer system. To be more specific, the tax-transfer
system leads to an increase in the cutoff ability and therefore to a decrease in the mass of managers.
This means that the redistribution scheme itself leads to an additional selection effect in the
economy. It is further shown that the redistribution scheme is distortionary, i.e. it decreases
welfare. There exists a trade-off between efficiency and equality both in the closed and in the
open economy. With a distortionary redistribution scheme in place it is no longer clear that
trade-induced inequality can be decreased without jeopardizing the gains from trade completely.
This paper is linked to the literature that addresses distributional effects of globalization ex-
ploiting heterogeneity (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009a, 2012; Helpman et al., 2010; Yeaple,
2005). In particular, this paper contributes to the literature that exploits the link between global-
ization and top income inequality. Keller and Olney (2017) argue that globalization is an important
driving force for the increase in top income inequality. This argument is also made in Gersbach and
Schmutzler (2007). Using a matching model they show that globalization increases the heterogene-
ity of managerial compensation. Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Gabaix et al. (2014) contribute
to the empirical literature that tries to explain CEO payments. They link changes in firms size to
the increase in top income inequality.
This paper is linked to previous work on redistributing gains from trade. Dixit and Norman
(1980, 1986) show the possibility of trade to be a Pareto improvement using redistribution policies
that are not lump-sum. Spector (2001) questions the possibility to redistribute gains from trade.
He argues that trade can lead to a loss in social welfare. The reason for this is as follows. In an
open economy prices are determined on the world market. The government may therefore not be
able to equalize equilibrium prices and wages through taxation. Naito (2006) also points to the
possibility of social welfare losses.
To the best of our knowledge the link between trade and inequality (exploiting heterogeneity) in
the presence of a welfare state redistributing income is not investigated thoroughly in the academic
literature so far. There are only few other papers on this topic with a different focus though. Egger
and Kreickemeier (2009b) integrate a distortionary tax-transfer system into a trade model with
heterogeneous firms and fair-wages. They show that lower inequality than under autarky without
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sacrificing the gains from trade completely is possible if trade is accompanied by an increase in the
profit tax rate. However, they focus on wage inequality and unemployment. Hence, it can be seen
complementary to our analysis. Itskhoki (2008) discusses the optimal policy response to trade-
induced inequality focusing on the equity-efficiency trade-off involved. Antràs et al. (2017) look
at possibilities to redistribute the gains from trade when redistribution is costly. Yet, they cannot
address inter-group inequality and intra-group inequality among the group of managers. Kohl
(2017) analyses the distributional effects of international trade in the presence of a redistribution
scheme that is financed through a proportional income tax giving the same per capita transfer to
all individuals. It is shown that this particular redistribution scheme is non-distortionary. In such
a framework it is always possible to decrease trade-induced inequality without jeopardising the
gains from trade. This is different as soon as we look at the more realistic case of a progressive
income tax which we discuss in this contribution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive the closed economy
equilibrium. In Section 3 we look at the open economy equilibrium. In particular, we discuss how
trade affects the factor allocation, welfare, the size of the welfare state and the income distribution
in the economy. Section 4 concludes by summarizing the most important results.
2 The closed economy
In this section we first describe the economic environment. The basic economic environment is
a simplified version of Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) with perfect labour markets. In a second
step we introduce a simple redistribution scheme and look at its impact on the equilibrium factor
allocation, welfare and the income distribution in the economy.
Individuals
The mass of individuals is an exogenous parameter of the model and denoted by N . We assume that
individuals are heterogeneous in their managerial ability. It will be shown that this heterogeneity
will drive the decision of individuals whether to become a manager or a worker. The managerial
ability can be used if an individual decides to become a manager. It is of no use in the role as
workers however. Managers are simultaneously the owner of the firm they are running and earn the
firm’s profit. Workers are paid an economy wide wage w regardless in which firm they are employed.
Production
There are two sectors in the economy: an intermediate goods sector and a final goods sector. In
the final goods sector we assume perfect competition. Final output is a homogeneous good and
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given by a CES-aggregate of all varieties, i.e.
Y =
[
∫
v∈V
q(v)
σ−1
σ dv
]
σ
σ−1
. (1)
The quantity of variety v of the intermediate good is denoted by q(v). The set of all available
varieties is given by V and the elasticity of substitution between the different varieties is indicated
by σ with σ > 1. Following Ethier (1982)3 we see that the production technology exhibits external
increasing returns to scale. We choose output as the numéraire implying that the price of the final
good is given by P = 1. Profit maximization in the final goods sector fixes demand for each variety
v of the intermediate good as follows
q(v) = Y p(v)−σ , (2)
with p(v) being the price of variety v. In the intermediate goods sector we assume monopolistic
competition along the lines of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). There is a continuum of firms where the
mass of firms will be endogenously determined in the model and is denoted by M . Each firm
produces its own variety v. Monopolistic competition implies that firms take aggregate variables
as exogenously given but set the price for their own variety like a monopolist. Because the ability
of the manager determines the productivity of the firm, ϕ(v), there is firm heterogeneity as in
Melitz (2003). Each firm is run by one manager who employs an endogenous number of workers
l(v), where the number of workers is proportional to output, i.e. l(v) = q(v)/ϕ(v). The firm
specific unit production cost are therefore given as c(v) = w/ϕ(v). Profit maximization in the
intermediate goods sector determines the price for each variety v as follows
p(v) =
σ
σ − 1
c(v). (3)
Because of CES the price is a constant mark-up over marginal costs. Combining the firm specific
prices (Eq. (3)) with the demand for each variety (Eq. (2)) we can write output and revenue in
the intermediate goods sector as follows
q(v) = Y
(
σ
σ − 1
w
ϕ(v)
)−σ
and r(v) = p(v)q(v) = Y
(
σ
σ − 1
w
ϕ(v)
)1−σ
. (4)
Operating profits of firms in the intermediate goods sector are then given by
πop(v) = r(v) − c(v)q(v) =
1
σ
r(v). (5)
3This modeling approach dates back to Ethier (1982). Many other scholars have used it since (e.g. Matusz, 1996;
Egger et al., 2015; Kohl, 2017).
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We can now compare output, employment, revenues and operating profits of two firms 1 and 2
and find
q(v1)
q(v2)
=
(
ϕ(v1)
ϕ(v2)
)σ
and
l(v1)
l(v2)
=
r(v1)
r(v2)
=
πop(v1)
πop(v2)
=
(
ϕ(v1)
ϕ(v2)
)σ−1
. (6)
We see that the productivity of a firm is decisive for its output, revenue, operating profits and
employment. Eq. (6) implies that more productive firms have higher output, higher revenues,
higher operating profits and also employ more workers.
Average productivity
We follow the literature and assume that ability and hence also productivity is Pareto distributed.
The cumulative distribution function with shape parameter k is given by G(ϕ) = 1−ϕ−k, where the
lower bound has been normalized to one. Assuming Pareto allows us to relate average productivity
ϕ̃ to the productivity of the marginal firm ϕ∗
ϕ̃ =
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
)
1
σ−1
ϕ∗, (7)
where k > σ − 1 is assumed.4 Combining Eq. (6) with Eq. (7) we find that
πop(ϕ̃) =
k
k − (σ − 1)
πop(ϕ∗). (8)
This means that there is a close link between profits of the average and the marginal firm in the
economy.
Aggregates
In this part the aggregates in the closed economy shall be determined. Aggregate output is given
by5
Ya = M
σ
σ−1 q(ϕ̃). (9)
Please note that the subscript a indicates the autarky equilibrium. Aggregate revenue is then
equal to
Ra = YaPa = M
σ
σ−1 q(ϕ̃) = Mr(ϕ̃), (10)
where we used the fact that the final good is chosen as the numéraire and hence its price is
normalized to one as well as noting that revenue is defined as price times quantity and the price
of the firm with average productivity is given by p(ϕ̃) = M
1
σ−1 .6 Aggregate operating profits can
4The derivation of Eq. (7) is deferred to the Appendix; see A.1.
5The derivation of Eq. (9) is deferred to the Appendix; see A.2.
6Note that the price of the firm with average productivity is got by combining Eqs. (2) and (9).
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be calculated as
Πopa = Mπ
op(ϕ̃) =
1
σ
Mr(ϕ̃) =
1
σ
Ra =
1
σ
Ya. (11)
In general equilibrium aggregate output can also be interpreted as aggregate income. We hence
see that a share of 1/σ of aggregate output goes to operating profit income whereas the remaining
share (σ − 1)/σ goes to aggregate labour income, i.e.
1
σ
Ya = Π
op
a and
σ − 1
σ
Ya = waLa. (12)
The redistribution scheme
The redistribution scheme consists of two parts: a tax part and a transfer part. The tax part looks
as follows. There is a proportional tax t on operating profit income7, where t ∈ (0, 1), but no tax
on wage income. This tax scheme captures the idea of a progressive income tax, since workers in
this model represent the low income group, whereas managers represent the high income group.8
The government collects the tax revenue and redistributes it to all individuals in the economy with
everyone getting the same absolute transfer payment b. By virtue of the budget constraint of the
government the transfer income for each individual is equal to
b =
tMπ̄
N
. (13)
In our analysis we will treat the per capita transfer b as endogenously determined by the budget
constraint of the government, whereas the tax rate t is treated as an exogenous parameter.9 An
important property of this tax-transfer system is that it does not change the pricing behavior of
firms. The reason for this is that the tax is proportional and the benefit is treated as exogenous
from the point of view of a single firm, since the transfer is determined by aggregates. And it is a
property of monopolistic competition that aggregates are regarded as exogenously given.
Occupational choice
Following Lucas (1978) and Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) individuals face the choice whether to
become a manager or a worker in the economy. They observe their own ability and choose the
occupation accordingly by comparing their income in the two different occupations. The labour
7Please note that in the closed economy there is no difference between operating profits and pure profits, since
there are no fixed costs involved in the closed economy. This is different in the open economy as will be discussed in
Section 3.
8This point will become obvious when discussing the occupational choice in the economy.
9The reverse assumption is discussed briefly below.
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indifference condition is therefore given by
w + b = (1 − t)π(ϕ∗) + b, (14)
where ϕ∗ is the productivity of the marginal firm. Since the ability of the manager determines the
productivity of a firm, ϕ∗ can be interpreted as the ability of the marginal manager that is just
indifferent between becoming a manager or a worker. This implies that individuals with ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
choose to become managers, whereas individuals with ϕ < ϕ∗ choose to become workers. It is
immediate from inspection of Eq. (14) that the transfer b leaves occupational choice unaffected,
while the tax t on managerial income distorts occupational choice, making it less attractive, ceteris
paribus, to become a manager. 10
Equilibrium factor allocation
Using the budget constraint of the government (cf. Eq. (13)) and the fact that aggregate labour
and profit income are constant shares of overall output (cf. Eq. (12)) as well as using Eq. (8) we
can write the labour indifference condition as
L =
k(σ − 1)
(k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
M. (15)
The labour indifference condition is illustrated in Figure 1.11 We see that it is an upward sloping
locus in the L − M space. An increase in the mass of workers decreases the wage ceteris paribus.
Likewise an increase in the mass of managers decreases the profit of the marginal manager ceteris
paribus. Therefore indifference requires a positive relationship between the mass of workers and
the mass of managers. If we compare the labour indifference condition with a strictly positive tax
with the case without taxation, we see that with the tax the labour indifference condition becomes
flatter. The reason for this is that with the progressive tax each level of profits is associated
with lower post-tax profits. Therefore the mass of workers has to increase (thereby lowering the
wage) in order to restore indifference. Total resources are constrained. The mass of individuals is
exogenously given in this model and denoted by N . Therefore the resource constraint constitutes
a second relationship between the mass of workers and the mass of managers, namely
L = N − M. (16)
In Figure 1 we see that the resource constraint is a downward sloping locus in the L − M space.
10This is a crucial difference to Kohl (2017) where taxation is not progressive. The particular redistribution scheme
in Kohl (2017) does not change the factor allocation in the economy and is therefore non-distortionary.
11In illustrating the equilibrium we follow Egger and Kreickemeier (2012).
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Combining the labour indifference condition with the resource constraint of the economy, we can
solve for the equilibrium factor allocation in the economy and get
Ma =
(k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
N and La =
k(σ − 1)
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
N. (17)
The cutoff ability is implicitly given by M = [1 − G(ϕ∗)]N . Using the assumption that abilities
are Pareto distributed, i.e. G(ϕ∗) = 1 − (ϕ∗)−k we can solve for the cutoff ability as a function of
the mass of firms, i.e.
ϕ∗ =
(
N
M
)
1
k
. (18)
In the left quadrant of Figure 1 the negative relationship between the mass of managers and
the cutoff ability is shown. Calculating the cutoff ability in the economy as a function of solely
exogenous parameters we get
ϕ∗a =
(
kσ − (σ − 1) − (k − (σ − 1)) t
(k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
)
1
k
. (19)
The equilibrium factor allocation as well as the equilibrium cutoff ability are illustrated in Figure
1. They all depend on the tax t. Compared to the equilibrium with no tax-transfer system we find
that the equilibrium with the redistribution scheme features a greater mass of workers, a smaller
mass of managers, and hence a higher cutoff ability.
Figure 1: Closed economy equilibrium with progressive taxation
✲✛
✻
ϕ∗
M
L
La
Ma
ϕ∗a 1 N
N
LIt>0a
RCa
CA
LIt=0a
Welfare
Following Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) we take a utilitarian approach and define welfare as
income per capita. Aggregate income is given by Eq. (11), i.e. Ya = σMπ
op(ϕ̃). Operating
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profits of the firm with average productivity ϕ̃ are linked to the profits of the marginal firm with
productivity ϕ∗ by Eq. (8). The labour indifference condition requires that profits of the marginal
firm are given by π(ϕ∗) = w/(1 − t). Therefore we can write the operating profits of the firm with
average productivity as follows
π(ϕ̃) =
k
k − (σ − 1)
w
1 − t
. (20)
The price of the intermediate good produced by the firm with average productivity is given by
p̃ = M1/(σ−1). We further know that all firms pay the same wage and therefore get the economy
wide wage under autarky as
w = w̃ = M
1
σ−1
σ − 1
σ
ϕ̃. (21)
Combining Eqs. (20) and (21) and using Eq. (7) we get the following expression for aggregate
income in the closed economy
Ya = M
σ
σ−1
a
k
k − (σ − 1)
σ
σ−1 σ − 1
1 − t
ϕ∗a. (22)
Looking at Eq. (22) we see that ceteris paribus aggregate income depends positively on the mass
of managers, the tax rate and the ability of the marginal manager. Using the equilibrium values
for the mass of managers Ma and the cutoff productivity ϕ
∗
a we can calculate welfare in closed
form solution and get
(
Y
N
)
a
=
σ − 1
1 − t
[
k(1 − t)
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
]
σ
σ−1
[
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
(k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
]
1
k
N
1
σ−1 .
(23)
It is straightforward to show that welfare under the tax-transfer system is smaller than welfare
without a tax-transfer system, i.e.12
(
Y
N
)t>0
a
<
(
Y
N
)t=0
a
. (24)
The tax-transfer system can therefore be called distortionary. The reason for the distortionary
character is that the tax-transfer system changes the equilibrium factor allocation. Again looking
at Eq. (22) we can disaggregate the overall effect of the redistribution scheme into three partial
effects. First, the change in the mass of managers needs to be taken into account. Relative to
a situation without a tax-transfer system the mass of managers decreases, which c.p. is wel-
fare decreasing. Second, the change in the cutoff ability needs to be taken care of. With this
redistribution scheme in place the marginal manager has a higher ability, which c.p. is welfare
enhancing. Third, the primary effect of the tax driving a wedge between the wage and the profit
12The proof is deferred to the Appendix; see A.3.
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of the marginal manager needs to be considered. By virtue of Eq. (20) the tax increases the profit
of the average firm for a given wage. This c.p. increases welfare. Since the first effect dominates
the second and third effect, welfare declines. This result corresponds to the finding by Egger
et al. (2015) that show that having a production technology as described by Eq. (1) the factor
allocation under autarky without any policy intervention is first-best and hence maximizes welfare.
Size of the welfare state
When introducing the redistribution scheme we argued that the progressive tax scheme is modeled
in a way that there is a tax on operating profits. The size of the welfare state is defined as the
total amount of tax revenue that is collected by the government and that can be redistributed, i.e.
SWSa = tΠ
op
a = t
1
σ
Ya. (25)
Looking at Eq. (11) we see that there is a close link between aggregate operating profits and
aggregate income, i.e. Πopa = (1/σ)Y and therefore also the size of the welfare state is linked to
aggregate income and welfare.
Income distribution
There are two possible occupations and therefore two income groups in this model: managers
and workers. When characterizing the income distribution in this economy let us first look at
the inequality between these two groups. This measure is referred to as inter-group inequality. It
is calculated as the ratio of average post tax-transfer13 managerial income and post tax-transfer
labour income. With the particular tax-transfer system considered we get
InterIneqa =
(1 − t)π̄ + b
w + b
. (26)
where the tax and the transfer are linked via the budget constraint of the government and average
profits and the wage are endogenous to the redistribution scheme. An increase in the tax rate
leads to a decrease in the wage. This can be seen easily. By Eq. (12) we know that total labour
income is a constant fraction of total output, i.e. wL = σ−1σ Y . Since an increase in the tax
rate decreases total output and increases the mass of workers, it directly follows that the wage
has to fall. This endogenous adjustment counteracts the primary inequality decreasing effect of
the redistribution scheme. Using the budget constraint of the government (Eq. (13)), the labour
indifference condition (Eq. (14)) and the equilibrium factor allocation (Eq. (17)) together with Eq.
13An alternative term for post tax-transfer income is secondary income. We will use these two terms interchange-
ably.
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(8) we find
InterIneqa =
k
k−(σ−1) +
tk
k(σ−1)+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
1 + tkk(σ−1)+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
. (27)
This is the expression for inter-group inequality in closed form taking all general equilibrium
effects into account. It is straightforward to show that ∂InterIneqa∂t < 0, which means that inter-
group inequality decreases in the tax rate.14 When talking about the factor allocation and income
per capita we found that results where solely driven by the tax part of the redistribution scheme.
This is different here. For the distributional effects the transfer is crucial. This point shall be
made clearer with the following thought experiment. Imagine there was a tax on operating profits,
but the tax revenue was thrown away. In this case the inter-group inequality can be calculated as
follows
InterIneqt>0,b=0a =
(1 − t)π̄
w
. (28)
Using π̄ = kk−(σ−1)π(ϕ
∗) (Eq. (8)) together with w = (1 − t)π(ϕ∗) (Eq. (13)) we get
InterIneqt>0,b=0a =
k
k − (σ − 1)
. (29)
Interestingly, this result is independent of the tax rate t. It is equal to the result for inter-group
inequality with no redistribution scheme at all. This finding is driven by the general equilibrium
adjustment of the factor prices as well as the Pareto distribution. Therefore we argue that the
transfer plays a crucial role for the distributional effects.
To get a richer picture of inequality we also want to look at the income distribution within
the groups. We refer to this as intra-group inequality. Within the group of workers there is no
heterogeneity. Every worker is paid the economy-wide wage w. Hence there is no income inequality
within this group. However, within the group of managers there is heterogeneity. Managers earn
the post tax profit of the firm they are running plus the transfer income. Since firm profits depend
on the managerial ability of the manager (cf. Eq. (6)) and managers differ in their managerial
ability, it follows that managers with a higher ability have a higher income compared to less able
managers. In order to characterize the income distribution across managers we calculate the Lorenz
curve for post tax-transfer managerial income. The cumulative secondary managerial income of
all manager with an ability lower than or equal to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕ∗, ∞] relative to the aggregate secondary
managerial income is given by
I(ϕ̄)
I
=
(1 − t)Π(ϕ̄) + bM(ϕ̄)
(1 − t)Π + bM
. (30)
14The proof is deferred to the Appendix; see A.4.
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We see that secondary managerial income consists of two parts: firstly, post tax profit income and
secondly, transfer income. We get the following Lorenz curve for secondary managerial income15
Qa(γ) =
kσ − (σ − 1) − [k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)] (1 − γ)
k−(σ−1)
k − t (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − γ)
kσ − (σ − 1)
,
(31)
where γ indicates the share of all firms with a productivity smaller or equal to ϕ̄. For each γ the
Lorenz curve shows the corresponding income share. The corresponding Gini coefficient can then
be calculated as
IntraIneqa = 1 − 2
∫ 1
0
Qa(γ)dγ =
k
k−(σ−1) −
2k
2k−(σ−1)
k
k−(σ−1) +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
. (32)
It is straightforward to show that ∂IntraIneqa∂t < 0, which means that intra-group inequality within
the group of managers decreases in the tax rate.16 This result depends crucially on the transfer
part of the redistribution scheme. Again imagine there was only a tax on profit income, but no
transfer payment. In this case the Gini coefficient would be equal to the Gini coefficient under a
scenario without any policy.17
In this section we characterized the income distribution in the economy using two measures.
First, we looked at the difference in average income levels between the two groups. Second,
we characterized the income distribution within the group of managers by calculating the Gini
coefficient. We showed that both inequality measures decrease in the tax rate. This means that
under autarky there clearly exists an efficiency equality trade-off. A positive tax rate decreases
inequality, but at the same time decreases welfare.
3 The open economy
In this section the equilibrium in the open economy will be described. We look at intra-industry
trade between two identical countries along the lines of Krugman (1980), Ethier (1982) and Melitz
(2003). This means that we face two-way trade in horizontally differentiated products. In partic-
ular, we discuss how the factor allocation, welfare, the size of the welfare state and the income
distribution are affected by trade.
Trade costs
There is free trade in the final goods sector, whereas trade in the intermediate goods sector is
15The derivation of the Lorenz curve is deferred to the Appendix; see A.5.
16The proof is deferred to the Appendix; see A.6.
17The calculation is deferred to the Appendix; see A.7.
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subject to trading costs. Following Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) there are two types of trade
costs. On the one hand, there is the standard iceberg transport cost, τ > 1. On the other hand,
each exporting firm has to hire an export consultant who is paid a fee f .
Redistribution scheme
As in the closed economy the redistribution scheme looks as follows. It is financed by a tax t on
operating profits.18 This tax revenue is then redistributed to all individuals with everyone getting
the same per-capita transfer b. By virtue of the budget constraint of the government, the transfer
payment is given by
b =
tMπ̄opo
N
, (33)
where subscript o denotes the open economy equilibrium.
Occupational choice
Also in the open economy the key mechanism in determining the equilibrium is the occupational
choice made by individuals. They have to choose whether to become a manager or a worker or an
export consultant. The labour indifference condition states that the post tax-transfer income of
the marginal manager should be equal to the post tax-transfer income of a worker and should also
be equal to the post tax-transfer income of an export consultant. With the transfer b being the
same for everybody, we can write the indifference condition for career choice as
(1 − t)π(ϕ∗) = w = f. (34)
Hence, as under autarky, occupational choice is distorted by the progressive tax.
Decision to export
In the open economy an additional decision needs to be made by managers, namely the decision
whether to export or not. Since countries are identical, the operating profits of an exporting firm
with domestic operating profits πop(ϕ) are equal to Ωπop(ϕ), with 1 < Ω ≡ 1 + τ1−σ ≤ 2. In
equilibrium there will be a marginal exporter with productivity ϕ∗χ that is just indifferent between
becoming an exporter or a non-exporter. The exporting indifference condition is therefore given
by
(1 − t)Ωπop(ϕ∗χ) − f = (1 − t)π
op(ϕ∗χ). (35)
18In the open economy there is a difference between operating profits and pure profits since the exporting activity
involves to pay fixed costs. For analytical tractability we assume that operating profits and not pure profits are taxed.
In the Supplement we also provide the results for taxing pure profits and discuss the differences. The Supplement is
available upon request.
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Firms with productivity levels ϕ ≥ ϕ∗χ become exporters, whereas firms with productivities ϕ < ϕ
∗
χ
produce only for the domestic market. Substituting for f from Eq. (34), and using Eq. (6), we can
rewrite the exporting indifference condition as follows
Ω = 1 +
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)σ−1
. (36)
We denote the share of exporting firms by χ. It can be calculated as the mass of exporting firms
relative to the mass of all firms, i.e.
χ =
1 − G(ϕ∗χ)
1 − G(ϕ∗)
=
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)k
= (Ω − 1)
k
σ−1 = τ−k. (37)
Hence, the share of exporting firms is independent of the tax-transfer system, and it is decreasing
in the level of transport cost.
Aggregates
The aggregates in the open economy are given as follows. Aggregate output is given by
Yo = (M(1 + χ))
σ
σ−1 q(ϕ̃). (38)
Aggregate revenue can be calculated as
Ro = YoPo = (M(1 + χ))
σ
σ−1 q(ϕ̃) = M(1 + χ)r(ϕ̃), (39)
where we used po(ϕ̃) = (M(1 + χ))
1
σ−1 and Po = 1. Aggregate operating profits are equal to
Πopo = M(1 + χ)π
op(ϕ̃) =
1
σ
Mr(ϕ̃) =
1
σ
Ro =
1
σ
Yo. (40)
We hence find that a share 1/σ of aggregate output goes to operating profits whereas a share
(σ − 1)/σ goes to aggregate labour income19, i.e.
1
σ
Yo = Π
op
o and
σ − 1
σ
Yo = woLo. (41)
Equilibrium factor allocation
We now want to see how the factor allocation in the economy changes when going from autarky
to trade and explain the driving forces. Having shown that the tax-transfer system leaves the
export decision unaffected, it is obvious that, for a given t, the results are identical to Egger and
19Please note that this property heavily depends on CES.
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Kreickemeier (2012). The first relationship between the mass of workers and the mass of managers
that we need to look at is given by the labour indifference condition. As already outlined the
labour indifference is achieved via the occupational choice mechanism (cf. Eq. (34)). Using Eqs.
(5) and (8) together with Eqs. (38) and (41) we can rewrite the labour indifference condition as
follows
L =
(σ − 1)k(1 + χ)
(1 − t) (k − (σ − 1))
M. (42)
The labour indifference condition constitutes an upward sloping relationship between the mass of
workers and the mass of managers and is illustrated in Figure 2 indicated as LIo. Compared to
the labour indifference condition under autarky it is less steep. The second relationship that is
needed in order to determine the equilibrium in the open economy is the resource constraint. It is
given by
L = N − (1 + χ)M. (43)
This means that individuals in the open economy are either managers of a firm or production
workers or employed as export consultants. It is also different from the resource constraint under
autarky, since export consultant are only needed in the open economy, not in the closed economy.
Combining Eqs. (42) and (43) we can determine the equilibrium factor allocation in the open
economy. We explicitly solve for the mass of manager Mo and the mass of workers Lo
Mo =
(1 − t) (k − (σ − 1))
(σ − 1)k(1 + χ) + (1 − t) (k − (σ − 1)) (1 + χ)
N,
Lo =
(σ − 1)k
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t) (k − (σ − 1))
N (44)
with the mass of export consultants following straightforwardly as χMo. The equilibrium factor
allocation in the open economy is illustrated in Figure 2.20 We see that compared to the autarky
equilibrium the mass of managers declines in the open economy, whereas the mass of workers stays
constant. In fact, the mass of managers in the open economy just declines by the factor 1/(1 + χ),
i.e. Mo = (1/(/1 + χ))Ma. In the left quadrant of Figure 2 the cutoff ability (i.e. the ability of
the marginal manager) is drawn as a downward sloping function of the mass of managers. The
cutoff ability is implicitly defined by M = [1 − G(ϕ∗)] N . Solving for the cutoff ability in the open
economy yields
ϕ∗o =
(
(σ − 1)k(1 + χ) + (1 − t) (k − (σ − 1)) (1 + χ)
(1 − t) (k − (σ − 1))
)
1
k
. (45)
Comparing the cutoff ability in the open economy to the cutoff ability in the closed economy we
see that it increases with trade. Indeed the following relationship holds: ϕ∗o = (1 + χ)
1
k ϕ∗a. This
20In illustrating the equilibrium we follow Egger and Kreickemeier (2012).
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means that under trade the marginal manager has a higher ability than under autarky. The reason
for this finding is the lower mass of managers under trade.
Figure 2: Open economy equilibrium with progressive taxation
✲✛
✻
✲✛
ϕ∗
M
L
Lo
Mo
ϕ∗o 1 N
N
N
1+χ
LIo
LIaRCa
RCo
CA
Welfare
As outlined by Eq. (38) output in the open economy is given by Y = M(1 + χ)σπop(ϕ̃). Following
the same steps as done in the autarky equilibrium, we get the following expression for aggregate
income
Yo = M
σ
σ−1
o
k
k − (σ − 1)
σ
σ−1 σ − 1
1 − t
(1 + χ)
σ
σ−1 ϕ∗o. (46)
If we compare aggregate income in the open economy to aggregate income in the closed economy
(Eq. (22)) we find three differences. First, the mass of managers decreases in the open economy
relative to autarky. This effect c.p. decreases welfare. Second, there are additional profits and
therefore also additional income coming from exporting, which c.p. increases welfare. Third, the
ability of the marginal manager is higher in the open economy than in the closed economy. This
higher cutoff productivity c.p. increases welfare. It is straightforward to show that the first two
effects just offset each other, since the mass of managers and therefore the mass of intermediate
goods declines exactly by the factor 1/(1 + χ) when going from autarky to trade. Hence, the only
effect that remains is the third effect, namely the increase in the cutoff productivity. We use Eqs.
(44) and (45) in order to get a closed form solution for welfare, i.e.
(
Y
N
)
o
= N
1
σ−1
σ − 1
1 − t
(1+χ)
1
k
[
(1 − t)k
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t) (k − (σ − 1))
]
σ
σ−1
[
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t) (k − (σ − 1))
(1 − t) (k − (σ − 1))
]
1
k
.
(47)
If we compare welfare in the open economy equilibrium with welfare in the autarky equilibrium
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we find that
(
Y
N
)
o
= (1 + χ)
1
k
(
Y
N
)
a
. (48)
We see that welfare in the open economy equilibrium is higher than welfare in the autarky equilib-
rium by the factor (1+χ)
1
k .21 This is exactly the increase in the cutoff productivity. Hence we can
conclude that welfare in the open economy is higher than under autarky because trade leads to
an increase in efficiency via a higher cutoff productivity. Not only in the closed economy but also
in the open economy the distortionary character of the tax-transfer system becomes obvious. It is
straightforward to show that welfare with the tax-transfer system is smaller than welfare without
the tax-transfer system, i.e.22
(
Y
N
)t>0
o
<
(
Y
N
)t=0
o
. (49)
Size of the welfare state
The size of the welfare state (denoted by SWS) in the open economy equilibrium is equal to the
tax rate t multiplied by the amount of operating profits in the open economy Πopo . By virtue of Eq.
(41) there is a close link between operating profits and aggregate income, i.e. Πopo =
1
σ Yo. When
deriving welfare for the open economy we argued that welfare increases when going from autarky
to trade. Because the size of the welfare state (for a given tax rate t) is determined by the amount
of operating profits and operating profits are linked closely to aggregate income (and hence also to
welfare), it directly follows that the size of the welfare state increase in the open economy relative
to autarky in the same way as does welfare, i.e.
SWSo = (1 + χ)
1
k SWSa. (50)
By virtue of the budget constraint of the government the tax revenue is redistributed to individuals
in a lump sum way with everyone getting a per capita transfer b. This means that also the per
capita transfer b increases in the open economy relative to autarky.23 This endogenous adjustment
of the size of the welfare state will have important implications for the income distribution and
will be discussed in the following.
Income distribution
As done for the closed economy we look at two inequality measures. First, the inter-group inequality
21Note that the gains from trade do not depend on the redistribution scheme. This result would change if we were
to fix the transfer b letting the tax rate t adjust endogenously in the open economy.
22The proof is deferred to the Appendix; see A.8.
23The analysis would be quite different if we were to hold the transfer b constant letting the tax rate t adjust
endogenously. Then, by virtue of the budget constraint of the government, the implication of trade would be a
decrease in the tax rate t, i.e. ↓ t ↑ Πopo = b̄N̄ .
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is determined. Second, the intra-group inequality within the group of managers is considered.24
The inter-group inequality is determined by the ratio of secondary profit income and secondary
labour income. It can be calculated as
InterIneqo =
(1 − t)π̄opo − χf + b
w + b
. (51)
If we compare this expression to the expression under autarky (Eq. (26)) it is at first sight not clear
how inter-group inequality changes in the open economy relative to autarky. Let us for a moment
ignore the government budget constraint, and assume that the transfer per capita was zero despite
a positive t. In this case it is straightforward to show that inter-group inequality increases in the
open economy because operating profits increase by more than the wage does. However, with the
redistribution scheme in place the transfer per capita is not zero. In fact the transfer per capita
in the open economy is higher than in the closed economy. When differentiating Eq. (51) with
respect to the per capita transfer b it becomes obvious that inter-group inequality decreases in
the size of the per capita transfer. This endogenous adjustment of the transfer payment in the
open economy equilibrium counteracts the primary increase in inter-group inequality. In order to
establish the overall effect of trade on the inter-group inequality we have to get the closed form
solution for inter-group inequality in the open economy. It amounts to
InterIneqo =
(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1) − χ +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
1 + tk(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
. (52)
We can now compare the closed form solution for inter-group inequality in the open economy
with the corresponding expression under autarky. It is straightforward to show that inter-group
inequality is higher in the open economy compared to autarky. The trade-induced increase in
inter-group inequality, however, is smaller than in the case where the transfer per capita was zero.
The reason for inter-group inequality to increase under trade is that the two groups in the society,
i.e. managers and workers25, do not benefit equally from trade. For a given tax rate t the post tax-
transfer profit income increases by more than the post tax-transfer wage income. In the Appendix
it is furthermore shown that inter-group inequality in the open economy is decreasing in the tax
rate, i.e. ∂InterIneqo∂t < 0.
When looking at inequality within the group of managers we again start by calculating the
Lorenz curve for secondary managerial income. In the open economy the Lorenz curve consists
of two parts, because there are two kinds of managers: non-exporters and exporters. The Gini
24Derivations and proofs for this whole part are deferred to the Appendix; see A.9 - A.16.
25Note that we do not mention the export consultants explicitly here since they earn the same as workers.
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coefficient for secondary managerial income in the open economy is given by
IntraIneqo =
σ−1
k−(σ−1)χ +
k
k−(σ−1) −
σ−1
2k−(σ−1)χ
2 − 2k2k−(σ−1)
σ−1
k−(σ−1)χ +
k
k−(σ−1) +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
. (53)
We show in the Appendix that, for a given tax rate t, intra-group inequality in the open economy
is higher than intra-group inequality in the closed economy. This is due to the selection of the
most productive firms into exporting. Furthermore we derive the effect of an increase in the tax
rate on intra-group inequality and prove the negative relationship.
We saw that income per capita depends negatively on the tax rate, whereas the two equality
measures we looked at depend positively on the tax rate. We hence can conclude that also in the
open economy there exists a trade-off between efficiency and equality.
Can trade lead to a Pareto improvement?
In the last section we argued that on average both groups in the society gain from trade (though
unequally). However, this does not imply that trade actually leads to a Pareto improvement. In
order to answer the question whether trade can lead to a Pareto improvement we have to compare
the post tax-transfer income of all individuals in the closed economy to the post tax-transfer income
of all individuals in the open economy.
Let us start by looking at the income of workers. Their income is given by the wage plus the
transfer, i.e. w + b. Since wage income (wL) is a constant fraction of overall income (Y ) and we
know that the mass of workers stays constant when going from autarky to trade whereas overall
income increases, it follows directly that the wage rate has to be higher in the open economy than
in the closed economy equilibrium. Furthermore we know that the transfer per capita endogenously
increases when going from autarky to trade. Therefore we can conclude that workers are definitely
better off under trade than under autarky.
Let us now turn to the group of managers. We already argued that the managers at the upper
end of the income distribution disproportionately gain from trade since there are additional profits
through exporting. Hence the remaining question is what happens to the mediocre managers.
We therefore compare the income of the marginal manager under trade with the income of the
manager (having the same ability) under autarky. The income of the marginal manager under
trade is given by (1 − t)πo(ϕ
∗
o) + bo. By virtue of the labour indifference condition (Eq. (34))
this is equal to the wage plus the transfer per capita, i.e. wo + bo. Using Eqs. (41), (48) and
(50) this can also be written as (1 + χ)
1
k wa + (1 + χ)
1
k ba. Let us compare this expression to the
income of the manager with ability ϕ∗o under autarky. Note that this manager is an inframarginal
manager under autarky since the cutoff ability is higher in the open economy than in the closed
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economy, i.e. ϕ∗o > ϕ
∗
a. The income of the respective manager is given by (1 − t)πa(ϕ
∗
o) + ba.
Using Eqs. (6), (14), (19) and (45) this can be expressed as (1 + χ)
σ−1
k wa + ba. For a moment let
us assume that there was no tax-transfer system in place implying that the transfer per capita is
zero. In this case the mediocre managers are losing from trade if σ > 2 and hence trade does not
lead to a Pareto improvement in this case. The tax-transfer system c.p. changes this parameter
constraint. With the tax-transfer system the mediocre managers are losing from trade if σ > Γ,
where Γ > 2.26 This means that with the tax-transfer system in place there is more room for
trade to lead to a Pareto improvement than without the tax-transfer system. Figure 3 plots the
secondary income of individuals as a function of their ability ϕ. The continuous line indicates
the secondary income schedule under trade, whereas the dotted line shows the secondary income
schedule under autarky.27 Graph 3a shows the case for t = 0 where trade does not lead to a Pareto
improvement. There is a group of low ability managers that are worse off when going from autarky
to trade. In contrast to this scenario, graph 3b illustrates the case for t = 0.5 where trade actually
leads to a Pareto improvement. We see that also the marginal manager in the open economy
gains from trade. Hence, as illustrated graphically, the presence of a welfare state increases the
parameter space where trade leads to a Pareto improvement.
4 Conclusion
By incorporating a government sector we have been able to study the distributional effects of
globalization in the presence of a welfare state redistributing income. The welfare state is financed
by a proportional tax on operating profits. This tax can be interpreted as a particularly simple
version of a progressive income tax, since managers represent the high income group, whereas
workers represent the low income group. The tax revenue is collected by the government and
redistributed to individuals in a lump sum fashion with everyone getting the same per capita
transfer. We show that the tax-transfer system affects the occupational choice of individuals and
therefore leads to a selection effect changing the factor allocation in the economy. Ceteris paribus,
an increase in the tax rate decreases welfare, but also lowers income inequality. This means that
there exists an efficiency equality trade-off both in the closed and in the open economy. We find
that, for a given tax rate, international trade leads to higher aggregate income but also to higher
income inequality on two fronts. Both inter-group inequality and intra-group inequality increases.
We also find that the size of the welfare state endogenously increases when going from the autarky
equilibrium to the open economy equilibrium. This implies that, for a given tax rate, the transfer
per capita is higher in the open economy than in the closed economy. This endogenous adjustment
26Note that this result is shown in the Appendix; see A.17.
27The secondary income schedules are derived in the Appendix; see A.18.
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Figure 3: Secondary income schedules
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is a counteracting force to the primary trade induced increase in inequality, yet cannot outweigh
it. We furthermore show that workers always gain from trade in this model while there exists the
possibility that mediocre managers are worse off after trade liberalization. However we show that
the tax-transfer system increases the room for trade to lead to a Pareto improvement.
22
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (7)
We want to derive average productivity as a function of marginal productivity. Revenues of the
firm with average productivity are given by
r(ϕ̃) =
1
1 − G(ϕ∗)
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
r(ϕ)dG(ϕ). (A.1)
Using Eq. (6) and G(ϕ) = 1 − ϕ−k we get
r(ϕ̃) =
k
k − (σ − 1)
r(ϕ∗). (A.2)
Again using Eq. (6) together with Eq. (A.2) we get Eq. (7).
A.2 Derivation of Eq. (9)
Aggregate output is given by
Y =
[
∫ ∞
0
Mq(ϕ)
σ−1
σ µ(ϕ)dϕ
]
σ
σ−1
. (A.3)
Using Eq. (6) as well as noting that µ(ϕ) is the conditional distribution of g(ϕ) on [ϕ∗, ∞), i.e.
µ(ϕ) =



g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗) if ϕ ≥ ϕ
∗,
0 otherwise
(A.4)
we get
Y = M
σ
σ−1
[
∫ ∞
0
((
ϕ
ϕ̃
)σ
q(ϕ̃)
)
σ−1
σ
µ(ϕ)dϕ
]
σ
σ−1
= M
σ
σ−1 ϕ̃−σq(ϕ̃)
[
∫ ∞
0
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
]
σ
σ−1
. (A.5)
Noting that ϕ̃ =
[∫∞
0 ϕ
σ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
]
1
σ−1 is a weighted average of the firm productivity levels ϕ we
directly get
Y = M
σ
σ−1 q(ϕ̃). (A.6)
A.3 Showing that
(
Y
N
)t>0
a
<
(
Y
N
)t=0
a
(
Y
N
)t>0
a
is given by Eq. (23), i.e.
(
Y
N
)t>0
a
=
σ − 1
1 − t
[
k(1 − t)
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
]
σ
σ−1
[
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
(k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
]
1
k
N
1
σ−1 .
(A.7)
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(
Y
N
)t=0
a
is given by
(
Y
N
)t=0
a
= (σ − 1)
[
k
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1))
]
σ
σ−1
[
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1))
k − (σ − 1)
]
1
k
N
1
σ−1 . (A.8)
We have to show that
1
1 − t
[
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
(kσ − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
]
1
k
<
[
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
(kσ − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
]
σ
σ−1
. (A.9)
Rewriting this inequality as a function of the tax rate t we get
f(t) ≡
1
1 − t
[
1 +
k(σ − 1)
kσ − (σ − 1)
t
1 − t
]−
kσ−(σ−1)
k(σ−1)
≤ 1. (A.10)
Noting that f(0) = 1 we have to show that f(t) is decreasing in t. We get
f ′(t) =
1
(1 − t)2
[
1 +
k(σ − 1)
kσ − (σ − 1)
t
1 − t
]−
kσ−(σ−1)
k(σ−1)

1 −
1
(1 − t) + k(σ−1)kσ−(σ−1) t

 < 0, (A.11)
since k(σ−1)kσ−(σ−1) < 1 which completes the proof.
A.4 Showing that
∂InterIneqa
∂t
< 0
Inter-group inequality in the closed economy is given by Eq. (27). Calculating the partial derivative
of InterIneqa with respect to the tax rate t we get
∂InterIneqa
∂t
=
k[k(σ−1)+(k−(σ−1))(1−t)]−tk(−k+(σ−1))
[k(σ−1)+(k−(σ−1))(1−t)]2
[
1 + tkk(σ−1)+(k−(σ−1))(1−t)
]
[
1 + tkk(σ−1)+(k−(σ−1))(1−t)
]2
−
k[k(σ−1)+(k−(σ−1))(1−t)]−tk(−k+(σ−1))
[k(σ−1)+(k−(σ−1))(1−t)]2
[
k
k−(σ−1) +
tk
k(σ−1)+(k−(σ−1))(1−t)
]
[
1 + tkk(σ−1)+(k−(σ−1))(1−t)
]2 . (A.12)
It is straightforward to show that indeed ∂InterIneqa∂t < 0 since
k
k−(σ−1) > 1.
A.5 Derivation of Eq. (31)
The cumulative secondary managerial income of all managers with a productivity level lower than
or equal to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕ∗, ∞] relative to the aggregate secondary managerial income is given by Eq. (30).
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Noting that
Π(ϕ̄) =
M
1 − G(ϕ∗)
∫ ϕ̄
ϕ∗
π(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
=
k
(σ − 1) − k
Mπ(ϕ∗)
[
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k−(σ−1)
− 1
]
M(ϕ̄) =
M
1 − G(ϕ∗)
∫ ϕ̄
ϕ∗
dG(ϕ)
= M
[
1 −
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k
]
(A.13)
and using Eqs. (8), (11), (13) and (17) we can rewrite Eq. (30) as follows
I(ϕ̄)
I
=
kσ − (σ − 1) − (k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1))(1 − t))
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k−(σ−1)
− t(k − (σ − 1))
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k
kσ − (σ − 1)
.
(A.14)
The share of all firms with a productivity smaller or equal to ϕ̄ is given by
γ ≡
M(ϕ̄)
M
= 1 −
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k
. (A.15)
Eq. (A.14) together with Eq. (A.15) deliver the Lorenz curve for post tax-transfer managerial
income.
A.6 Showing that
∂IntraIneqa
∂t
< 0
Intra-group inequality in the closed economy is given by Eq. (32). Calculating the partial derivative
of IntraIneqa with respect to the tax rate t we get
∂IntraIneqa
∂t
= −
k
k−(σ−1) −
2k
2k−(σ−1)
[
k
k−(σ−1) +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
]2
×
k [(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))] + tk [k − (σ − 1)]
[(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))]2
. (A.16)
It is straightforward to show that indeed ∂IntraIneqa∂t < 0, since
k
k−(σ−1) >
2k
2k−(σ−1) .
A.7 Derivation of IntraIneqt>0,b=0a
Imagine there was a positive tax on operating profits, but the tax income was thrown away. For
this case we want to derive the Gini coefficient for secondary managerial income. The cumulative
secondary managerial income of all managers with a productivity level lower than or equal to
ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕ∗, ∞] relative to the aggregate secondary managerial income is given by
I(ϕ̄)
I
=
(1 − t)Π(ϕ̄)
(1 − t)Π
. (A.17)
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It becomes immediately obvious that the tax rate cancels. Using Eqs. (6), (8) and (11) we get
I(ϕ̄)
I
= 1 −
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k−(σ−1)
. (A.18)
The share of all firms with a productivity smaller or equal to ϕ̄ is given by Eq. (A.15). Eq. (A.18)
together with Eq. (A.15) deliver the Lorenz curve for secondary managerial income as follows
Qt>0,b=0a (γ) = 1 − (1 − γ)
1− σ−1
k . (A.19)
From the Lorenz curve we can then derive the Gini coefficient and get
IntraIneqt>0,b=0a = 1 − 2
∫ 1
0
Qt>0,b=0a (γ)dγ =
σ − 1
2k − (σ − 1)
. (A.20)
Please note that the Gini coefficient is the same as in the case when there is no redistribution
scheme at all.
A.8 Showing that
(
Y
N
)t>0
o
<
(
Y
N
)t=0
o
(
Y
N
)t>0
o
is given by Eq. (47), i.e.
(
Y
N
)t>0
o
=N
1
σ−1
σ − 1
1 − t
(1 + χ)
1
k
[
(1 − t)k
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t) (k − (σ − 1))
]
σ
σ−1
[
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t) (k − (σ − 1))
(1 − t) (k − (σ − 1))
]
1
k
. (A.21)
(
Y
N
)t=0
o
is given by
(
Y
N
)t=0
o
= N
1
σ−1 (σ − 1)(1 + χ)
1
k
[
k
(σ − 1)k + (k − (σ − 1))
]
σ
σ−1
[
(σ − 1)k + (k − (σ − 1))
(k − (σ − 1))
]
1
k
.
(A.22)
Showing that
(
Y
N
)t>0
o
≤
(
Y
N
)t=0
o
results in showing that
1
1 − t
[
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
(kσ − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
]
1
k
<
[
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
(kσ − (σ − 1)) (1 − t)
]
σ
σ−1
. (A.23)
This problem is exactly identical to the one in the closed economy (cf. Eq. (A.9)). Therefore the
proof is identical to the one in A.3.
A.9 Showing that InterIneqb=0o > InterIneq
b=0
a
Inter-group inequality under autarky in the case of zero transfer payments is given by
InterIneqb=0a =
(1 − t)πop(ϕ̃)
w
. (A.24)
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Using Eqs. (8) and (14) we get
InterIneqb=0a =
k
k − (σ − 1)
. (A.25)
Inter-group inequality in the open economy in the case of zero transfer payments is given by
InterIneqb=0o =
(1 − t)(1 + χ)πop(ϕ̃) − χf
w
. (A.26)
Using Eqs. (8) and (34) we get
InterIneqb=0o = (1 + χ)
k
k − (σ − 1)
− χ. (A.27)
Comparing Eqs. (A.27) and (A.25) it becomes obvious that inter-group inequality in the open
economy is higher than under autarky since kk−(σ−1) > 1. The trade-induced increase in inter-
group inequality amounts to
∆InterIneqb=0o,a = InterIneq
b=0
o − InterIneq
b=0
a = χ
k
k − (σ − 1)
− χ. (A.28)
A.10 Derivation of Eq. (52)
Starting point in order to derive inter-group inequality in closed form solution is Eq. (51). Using
Eqs. (40) and (33) we get
InterIneqo =
(1 − t)(1 + χ)πop(ϕ̃) − χf + tM(1+χ)π
op(ϕ̃)
N
w + tM(1+χ)π
op(ϕ̃)
N
. (A.29)
Using Eqs. (8) and (34) we can rewrite Eq. (A.29) as follows
InterIneqo =
N(1 − t)(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1)π
op(ϕ∗) − Nχ(1 − t)πop(ϕ∗) + tM(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1)π
op(ϕ∗)
N(1 − t)πop(ϕ∗) + tM(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1)π
op(ϕ∗)
.
(A.30)
Using the equilibrium factor allocation given by Eq. (44) and simplifying terms we get Eq. (52).
A.11 Showing that InterIneqo > InterIneqa
Inter-group inequality in the open economy is given by Eq. (52). Inter-group inequality in the
closed economy is given by Eq. (27). In order to show that inter-group inequality in the open
economy is higher than inter-group inequality in the closed economy we just have to show that
(1 + χ)
k
k − (σ − 1)
− χ >
k
k − (σ − 1)
χ
k
k − (σ − 1)
− χ > 0
χ(
k
k − (σ − 1)
− 1) > 0. (A.31)
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This is the case since χ > 0 and kk−(σ−1) > 1. The trade-induced increase in inter-group inequality
amounts to
∆InterIneqo,a = InterIneqo − InterIneqa =
χ kk−(σ−1) − χ
1 + tk(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
. (A.32)
This increase is smaller than the increase when b = 0 (Eq. (A.28)) since tk(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1)) > 0.
A.12 Showing that
∂InterIneqo
∂t
< 0
Inter-group inequality in the open economy is given by Eq. (52). Calculating the partial derivative
of InterIneqo with respect to the tax rate t we get
∂InterIneqo
∂t
=
k[(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))]+tk(k−(σ−1))
[(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))]2
[
1 + tk(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
]
[
1 + tk(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
]2
−
k[(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))]+tk(k−(σ−1))
[(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))]2
[
(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1) − χ +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
]
[
1 + tk(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
]2 .
(A.33)
It is straightforward to show that indeed ∂InterIneqo∂t < 0 since (1 + χ)
k
k−(σ−1) − χ > 1.
A.13 Derivation of Eq. (53)
When deriving the Gini coefficient for secondary managerial income in the open economy we need
to distinguish between exporters and non-exporters. The Lorenz curve will therefore have two parts
which we will derive step by step in this section. The ratio of cumulative secondary managerial
income for all non-exporters with a productivity level lower than or equal to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕ∗, ϕ∗χ) and
aggregate secondary managerial income Io is given by
28
Ine(ϕ̄)
Io
=
(1 − t)Πne(ϕ̄) + bM(ϕ̄)
(1 − t)M(1 + χ)πop(ϕ̃) − Mχf + bM
(A.34)
with
Πne(ϕ̄) =
M
1 − G(ϕ∗)
∫ ϕ̄
ϕ∗
π(ϕ)dG(ϕ) =
k
(σ − 1) − k
Mπ(ϕ∗)
[
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k−(σ−1)
− 1
]
M(ϕ̄) =
M
1 − G(ϕ∗)
∫ ϕ̄
ϕ∗
dG(ϕ) = M
[
1 −
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k
]
. (A.35)
Using Eqs. (8), (33), (34) and (44) we get
Ine(ϕ̄)
Io
=
k
(σ−1)−k
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k−(σ−1)
− k(σ−1)−k +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1)) −
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k
(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1) − χ +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
.
(A.36)
28It is shown in A.14 that this ratio is increasing in b.
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The ratio of firms with productivity levels lower than or equal to ϕ̄ is given by
γ =
M(ϕ̄)
M
= 1 −
(
ϕ̄
ϕ∗
)−k
. (A.37)
Combining Eqs. (A.36) and (A.37) we get the first segment of the Lorenz curve
Q1o(γ) =
k
(σ−1)−k (1 − γ)
k−(σ−1)
k −
k
(σ−1)−k +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1)) −
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1)) (1 − γ)
(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1) − χ +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
.
(A.38)
If we evaluate Q1o at γ = hM with hM ≡ 1 −
(
ϕ∗χ
ϕ∗
)−k
= 1 − χ we get
Q1o(hM ) =
k
(σ−1)−k χ
k−(σ−1)
k − k(σ−1)−k +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1)) −
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1)) χ
(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1) − χ +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
. (A.39)
The ratio of cumulative secondary managerial income for all firms (exporters and non-exporters)
with a productivity level up to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕ∗χ, ∞) and aggregate secondary managerial income Io is
determined as follows
I(ϕ̄)
Io
= Q1o(hM ) +
(1 − t)Πope (ϕ̄) − f(M(ϕ̄) − M(ϕ
∗
χ)) + b(M(ϕ̄) − M(ϕ
∗
χ))
(1 − t)Πop − fχM + bM
. (A.40)
Note that
M(ϕ̄) − M(ϕ∗χ) = M


(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)k
−
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k

 (A.41)
and
Πope (ϕ̄) =
M
1 − G(ϕ∗)
∫ ϕ̄
ϕ∗χ
πope (ϕ)dG(ϕ)
=
Mkπ(ϕ∗)Ω
σ − k − 1
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k−(σ−1)
−
Mkπ(ϕ∗)Ω
σ − k − 1
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)k−(σ−1)
. (A.42)
Using Eqs. (A.41) and (A.42) as well as Eqs. (8), (33) and (34) we can write Eq. (A.40) as follows
I(ϕ̄)
Io
= Q1o(hM )+
kΩ
σ−k−1
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k−(σ−1)
−
kΩ
σ−k−1
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)k−(σ−1)
−
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)k
+
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k
(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1) − χ +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
+
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)k
−
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k
(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1) − χ +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
. (A.43)
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Using γ = 1 −
(
ϕ̄
ϕ∗
)−k
and hM ≡ 1 −
(
ϕ∗χ
ϕ∗
)−k
= 1 − χn we can derive the second segment of the
Lorenz curve as follows
Q2o(γ) ≡ Q1o(hM )+
kΩ
σ−k−1(1 − γ)
k−(σ−1)
k −
kΩ
σ−k−1χ
k−(σ−1)
k − χ + (1 − γ)
(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1) − χ +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
+
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1)) χ −
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1)) (1 − γ)
(1 + χ) kk−(σ−1) − χ +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
. (A.44)
It can be shown that Q1o(hM ) = Q2o(hM ). Putting the two segment together, the Lorenz curve
for secondary managerial income in the open economy is given by
Qo(γ) ≡



Q1o(γ) if γ ∈ [0, hM )
Q2o(γ) if γ ∈ [hM , 1].
(A.45)
The Gini coefficient can then be calculated as
IntraIneqo = 1 − 2
∫ 1
0
Qo(γ)dγ = 1 − 2
[
∫ hM
0
Q1o(γ)dγ +
∫ 1
hM
Q2o(γ)dγ
]
. (A.46)
Using Eqs. (A.38), (A.44) and (A.46) tedious calculation leads to Eq. (53)
A.14 Showing that
Ine(ϕ̄)
Io
is increasing in b
We have to show that
∂ Ine(ϕ̄)Io
∂b
=
M(ϕ̄) [(1 − t)M(1 + χ)πop(ϕ̃) − Mχf + bM ] − M [(1 − t)Πne(ϕ̄) + bM(ϕ̄)]
[(1 − t)M(1 + χ)πop(ϕ̃) − Mχf + bM ]2
> 0.
(A.47)
Using Eq. (A.35) the problem simplifies to show that
M
[
1 −
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k
]
[(1 − t)M(1 + χ)πop(ϕ̃) − Mχf ] >
M(1 − t)
k
(σ − 1) − k
Mπ(ϕ∗)
[
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k−(σ−1)
− 1
]
. (A.48)
Using Eqs. (8) and (34) we are left with showing that
[
1 −
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k
]
[
(1 + χ)
k
k − (σ − 1)
− χ
]
>
[
1 −
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k−(σ−1)
]
k
k − (σ − 1)
. (A.49)
This holds since kk−(σ−1) > 1 and
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k
<
(
ϕ∗
ϕ̄
)k−(σ−1)
.
A.15 Showing that IntraIneqo > IntraIneqa
Intra-group inequality in the open economy is given by Eq. (53). Intra-group inequality in the
closed economy is given by Eq. (32). In order to show that, for a given tax rate t, intra-group
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inequality in the open economy is higher than intra-group inequality in the closed economy the
problem can be written as follows
A − B + C
A + D
>
C
D
(A.50)
with
A =
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
χ
B =
σ − 1
2k − (σ − 1)
χ2
C =
k
k − (σ − 1)
−
2k
2k − (σ − 1)
D =
k
k − (σ − 1)
+
tk
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))
.
We therefore have to show that (A − B)D > AC, i.e.
(
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
χ −
σ − 1
2k − (σ − 1)
χ2
)(
k
k − (σ − 1)
+
tk
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))
)
>
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
χ
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
−
2k
2k − (σ − 1)
)
. (A.51)
Rearranging yields
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
χ
tk
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))
−
σ − 1
2k − (σ − 1)
χ2
tk
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))
+
σ − 1
2k − (σ − 1)
χ
2k
k − (σ − 1)
−
σ − 1
2k − (σ − 1)
χ2
k
k − (σ − 1)
> 0, (A.52)
which is clearly fulfilled since both
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
χ
tk
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))
−
σ − 1
2k − (σ − 1)
χ2
tk
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))
> 0
and
σ − 1
2k − (σ − 1)
χ
2k
k − (σ − 1)
−
σ − 1
2k − (σ − 1)
χ2
k
k − (σ − 1)
> 0.
A.16 Showing that
∂IntraIneqo
∂t
< 0
Intra-group inequality in the open economy is given by Eq. (53). Calculating the partial derivative
of IntraIneqo with respect to the tax rate t we get
∂IntraIneqo
∂t
= −
σ−1
k−(σ−1)χ +
k
k−(σ−1) −
σ−1
2k−(σ−1) χ
2 −
2k
2k−(σ−1)
[
σ−1
k−(σ−1)χ +
k
k−(σ−1) +
tk
(σ−1)k+(1−t)(k−(σ−1))
]2
×
k2(σ − 1) + (1 − t)k(k − (σ − 1)) + tk(k − (σ − 1))
[(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))]2
. (A.53)
It is obvious that indeed ∂IntraIneqo∂t < 0.
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A.17 Condition for trade not to be a Pareto improvement
The marginal manager under trade loses from trade iff
(1 + χ)
1
k wa + (1 + χ)
1
k ba < (1 + χ)
σ−1
k wa + ba. (A.54)
This is the sufficient condition for trade not to lead to a Pareto improvement. Eq. (A.54) can be
rewritten as follows
σ > 1 +
k log
[
(1 + χ)
1
k + (1 + χ)
1
k
ba
wa
−
ba
wa
]
log(1 + χ)
. (A.55)
This means that the marginal manager under trade loses from trade iff
σ > Γ with Γ = 1 +
k log
[
(1 + χ)
1
k + (1 + χ)
1
k
ba
wa
−
ba
wa
]
log(1 + χ)
. (A.56)
In order to show that Γ > 2 we have to show that
k log
[
(1 + χ)
1
k + (1 + χ)
1
k
ba
wa
−
ba
wa
]
log(1 + χ)
> 1. (A.57)
This can be rewritten as follows
1 +
k log
(
1 + bawa −
1
(1+χ)
1
k
ba
wa
)
log(1 + χ)
> 1. (A.58)
Eq. (A.58) clearly holds since k > σ − 1 with σ > 1 and bawa −
1
(1+χ)
1
k
ba
wa
> 0 as well as χ > 0.
A.18 Deriving the secondary income schedules in Figure 3
The secondary income for all individuals with abilities ϕ < ϕ∗a under autarky (these are workers)
is given by
wa + ba =
σ−1
σ Ya
La
+
t 1σ Ya
N
. (A.59)
Using Eqs. (17) and (23) this can be written as follows
wa + ba =
(
(1 − t)k
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))
N
)
1
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
(
(σ − 1)k + (1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))
(1 − t)(k − (σ − 1))
)
1
k
+ t
1
σ
σ − 1
1 − t
(
k(1 − t)
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1))(1 − t)
)
σ
σ−1
(
k(σ − 1) + (k − (σ − 1))(1 − t)
(k − (σ − 1))(1 − t)
)
1
k
N
1
σ−1 . (A.60)
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The secondary income for all individuals with abilities ϕ ≥ ϕ∗a under autarky (these are managers)
is given by (1 − t)πa(ϕ) + ba. Using Eqs. (6) and (14) this can be written as follows
(1 − t)πa(ϕ) + ba =
(
ϕ
ϕ∗a
)σ−1
wa + ba. (A.61)
Note that ϕ∗a is given by Eq. (19), whereas wa and ba are given by Eq. (A.60).
The secondary income for all individuals with abilities ϕ < ϕ∗o under trade (these are workers and
export consultant) is given by
wo + bo = (1 + χ)
1
k (wa + ba). (A.62)
Note that we used Eqs. (41), (48) and (50).
The secondary income for all individuals with abilities ϕ∗o ≤ ϕ < ϕ
∗
χ under trade (these are non-
exporting managers) is given by (1 − t)πo + bo. Using Eqs. (6) and (34) this can be written as
follows
(1 − t)πo(ϕ) + bo =
(
ϕ
ϕ∗o
)σ−1
wo + bo. (A.63)
Note that ϕ∗o is given by Eq. (45), whereas wo and bo are given by Eq. (A.62).
The secondary income for all individuals with abilities ϕ ≥ ϕ∗χ under trade (these are exporting
managers) is given by (1 − t)Ωπo − f + bo. Note that Ω is determined by Eq. (36), the fixed
exporting cost f is equal to the wage wo in equilibrium and ϕ
∗
χ =
1
χ
1
k ϕ∗o (where we used Eq. (37)).
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